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I. INTRODUCTION 
Because we had a common religion and for the most part, a common language, we felt we were dealing 
with friends not foes. In the case of our neighbors, we shared the same Arab perspective on life and the 
world. Or so we believed. Unfortunately, we found to our dismay that it took more than such 
commonalties to build a solid foundation for trustworthy relationships.1 
 
In June 1965, alarmed by frequent reports of Egyptian teachers inciting political activism among Libyan 
students, King Idris arranged for secret police to be dispatched to secondary schools across the country. 
Since the mid-1950s, Egyptian professionals dispatched throughout the Arab world by the Nasserite regime 
were frequently accused of acting as political agents, but never had a host country gone through such an 
extreme step to verify these claims. Planted among young secondary school students, members of the Libyan 
secret police soon reported back that the Egyptians were, indeed, engaged in disseminating revolutionary 
ideas through their teachings. By early July 1965, eighty Egyptian teachers seconded to Libya were deported, 
and their contracts duly terminated. Yet Cairo remained nonchalant: despite harsh warnings from British 
diplomats in Benghazi, more than six hundred Egyptians continued to be employed across Libya, while more 
teachers were later recruited from Cairo. In a phenomenon commonly repeated across the Middle East at the 
time, Arab authorities were unable to find adequate numbers of replacement non-Egyptian staff, local or 
foreign. At the same time, the manpower needs of the region’s newer states buttressed the position of 
Nasser’s Egypt as supplier of highly trained, albeit deeply politicized, professionals. 
More than forty years after Nasser’s death, the logistics behind Egypt’s pre-1967 migration policy have not 
been the subject of extensive research. Most studies on Egyptian population movements tend to skim the 
Nasserite period, on which little official migration-related data exist and which is overshadowed by the later 
migration en masse to the oil-rich countries. Hints of the strategic value that the Egyptian state attached to 
professionals’ temporary migration through its secondment program (niẓām al-i‘āra li-l-khārij) exist in 
research ranging from broad overviews on Egypt’s Nasserite era,2 to works published on the history of Arab 
                                            
1
 Mohammed Al-Fahim, From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi. (I. B. Tauris, 1998): 160. 
2
 A.I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy. (New York: Wiley 1976); Anthony Nutting, Nasser. (New 
York: E.P. Dutton, 1972); Robert Henry Stephens, Nasser: a political biography. (London: Allen Lane, 1971). 
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states’ development, 3  and from studies on Middle Eastern migration movements 4  to international 
organizations’ policy reports.5 Yet, little of substance is known about seconded Egyptians’ actions abroad 
save from references to either ‘Egypt’s pioneering emigrants [who] first offered their skills to the nascent 
development of neighboring Arab countries’6 or, in more critical accounts, to seconded Egyptians’ role in 
‘the revolutionary, Arab nationalist tide which inundated the Gulf and Arabian peninsula region in the 
1950s.’7 In fact, by failing to examine this form of migration in depth and to properly contextualize it within 
Nasserite Egypt’s political agenda, such studies underestimate the extent to which the policy of secondment, 
the sole notable exception to an overall restrictive state emigration policy, constituted a key component of 
Egypt’s foreign policy. 
This article aims to present in analytical and critical context a cache of archival material on Egyptian 
migration from this period, and argue that Egyptian teachers’ regional migration through the state 
secondment programme was employed by the regime in furthering its foreign policy agenda across specific 
countries in the Arab world. The English-language documents employed are British consular and diplomatic 
reports, many of which were previously inaccessible and recently acquired through the Freedom of 
Information Act. While very little archival material is available in Egypt, statistical data were also obtained 
from the Department of Secondment in the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, research has been conducted 
at the Middle East Centre Archive at the University of Oxford, while details on the rationale and 
development of the policy are derived from the three main Egyptian newspapers of the time (al-Ahram, al-
Akhbar, al-Jumhuriya). Finally, the article critically employs state publications as well as secondary sources 
on Arab states’ 1954–1967 development, and Western media reports on Egyptians’ activity abroad. The 
reversal of the Egyptian state’s emigration policy in the post-1967 period towards gradual liberalisation of 
population movements (formalised in the 1971 Constitution) prevents the period’s inclusion in this analysis. 
At the same time, in light of space limitations, this article does not expand upon Nasser’s secondment policy 
towards African states, nor does it expand its discussion beyond the activities of Egyptian teachers, who, by 
                                            
3
 Ian J. Seccombe and R. I. Lawless, "Foreign worker dependence in the Gulf, and the international oil companies: 1910-50," 
International Migration Review, 1986); Robert Vitalis, America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007); Enid Hill, Takhdith al-Amal wa qwaninhu fi al-Halij al-Arabi. (Cairo: The American University of 
Cairo Press, 1979). 
4
 Ralph R. Sell, Hijra ila 'l-abad? Harakat al-hijra al-masriyya fi al-'alam al-'arabi. (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 
1987). 
5
 International Organization for Migration, al-Mu'tamar al-Iqlimi 'an al-Hijra al-'Arabiyya fi Zall al-'Awlama. (Geneva: IOM, 2004). 
6
 Robert LaTowsky, "Egyptian Labor Abroad: Mass Participation and Modest Returns," MERIP Reports 14, 4 (1984). 
7
 Khaldun Hasan Naqib, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: a Different Perspective. (London: Routledge, 1990): 101. 
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virtue of their profession, were the most able to influence local populations (in contrast to, for instance, 
Egyptian engineers or doctors abroad). 
In tying Egyptian migration to Nasser’s foreign policy objectives, the article aims to further disprove the 
conventional wisdom that Egyptian migration became a socio-political issue only in the post-1970 era, or the 
view in part of the literature that, ‘until the events of 1973, the strong political differences among the 
countries in the region […] created […] political barriers to population mobility.’8 In fact, simultaneously 
with the development of a pro-active regional policy in 1955-56, Nasser implemented a gradual expansion 
and politicization of Egypt’s secondment policy, reformulating its key aspects in order to align it closely 
with Egypt’s foreign policy objectives across the Arab world. This article examines, in particular, how 
Egyptian teachers’ actions in Libya, Syria, Yemen and the Persian Gulf corresponded to the regime’s foreign 
policy priorities in each case, respectively, in an attempt to underline the determination and consistency with 
which the Egyptian state, over the sixteen years of Nasser’s rule, dispatched thousands of teaching staff 
across the Arab world, and lend credence to how migration buttressed Egypt’s regional ambitions. 
 
II. THE PRE-1952 ORIGINS OF EGYPT’S SECONDMENT POLICY 
Broadly, Egypt’s policy of secondment traces its roots to Muhammad Ali’s attempts at modernization and 
state reform, which allowed the country to develop an extensive bureaucratic capacity early on, and the 
continuation of process of reform and educational advances under Khedive Ismail. Despite the fact that 
illiteracy continued to be a major problem throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the 
obstructionist policy of the Earl of Cromer in Egypt during the 1878-1907 period,9 educational facilities 
catered to an increasing number of students. At the same time, the 1871 founding of Dar al-Ulum, a Training 
College for Teachers of Arabic, and a separate Teachers’ Training College in 1886 substantially increased 
the number of trained teaching staff within Egypt.10 By 1949, in their landmark study of Arab educational 
systems, Matthews and Akrawi argue: 
Egypt’s educational system has a considerably longer history than that of [the rest 
of the Arab world]. Whereas the other Arab countries […] started afresh after 
                                            
8
 Nazli Choucri, Migration in the Middle East: Transformation and Change. (1982): 16. 
9
 P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Modern Egypt, 4th ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991): 467-71. 
10
 Ibid: 476 
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World War I, the Egyptian educational system in general dates back more than a 
century.11 
Egyptian secondment becomes prominent in the post-1922 era when, as Arab nationalist intellectual trends 
came to dominate political discourse in Cairo, the state extended various forms of educational assistance to 
its Arab neighbours, from welcoming non-Egyptian Arab students from those countries into al-Azhar and the 
newly-established Cairo University to providing funding for the construction of schools abroad. 12  In 
particular, Arab shortages in educational staff were to be overcome through Egypt’s policy of secondment, 
which earned it the affectionate name al-Shaqīqa al-Kubrá. This early dispatch of small numbers of 
Egyptians abroad supplanted a growing sense of distinction amongst Egyptian elites on the country’s place 
within the Arab world. Echoing a common sentiment in terms of the domestic perception of Egypt’s 
educational role in the region, Egyptian historian Hussein Fawzi al Najjar writes: 
It was no coincidence that Egypt should outpace its brethren Arab states in 
civilization, for when Mohamed Ali embarked on the building of the modern state 
in Egypt and sent out academic missions to Europe, the Middle East had not yet 
awakened from their slumber. When those countries at last started their own 
civilization at last and began liberating themselves rapidly from the yoke of the 
Middle Ages, they found only Egypt to supply their needs of schoolteachers and 
higher education professors.13 
In the mid-1930s, ‘strengthened by the establishment of the British-conceived Arab League and by King 
Faruq’s pro-Arab and Pan-Islamic policies,’ Egypt began dispatching small numbers of trained professionals 
in neighbouring countries. 14 Administrators and legal scholars were also sent abroad: one notable example is 
‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī, who drafted the Egyptian Civil Code. Al- Sanhūrī travelled to Baghdad to found 
the city’s School of Law in the mid-1930s, and drafted the Iraqi Civil Code in 1943.15 More than any other 
professions, however, teachers were commonly dispatched to countries that were developing their national 
educational systems: Egyptians were recruited to work in Kuwait’s first two public schools, al-Mubārakiyya 
and al-Aḥmadiyya, from the mid-1930s onwards and in Iraqi schools from 1936 onwards.16 In fact, in the 
                                            
11
 Roderic D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi, al-Tarbiyah fī al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ al-ʻArabī: Miṣr, al-ʻIrāq, Filastīn, Sharq al-Urdun, 
Sūriyā, Lubnān. (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Miṣriyah, 1949). 
12
 Aside from secondary schools, Egypt established a model secondary school in Rabat in 1956; Alexandria University opened a 
branch in Beirut, in 1961. See: Fahim Issa Qubain, Education and Science in the Arab World. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1966).  
13
 al-Ahram, 17 July 1976. 
14
 The details of the 1922-1952 period fall beyond the scope of this article. See R.H. Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in 
Political Dynamics. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971); Michael Scott Doran, Pan-Arabism before Nasser: 
Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
15
 Nabil Saleh, "Civil Codes of Arab Countries: The Sanhuri Codes," Arab Law Quarterly 8, 2 (1993). 
16
 FO 141/660/12-1937. 
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pre-1956 period, secondary school students across the Arab world would receive the Tawjīhiyya, the 
Egyptian Secondary School Certificate, upon graduation.17  
In the Gulf, while the reign of Sheikh Abdullah Qasim al-Thani in Qatar prevented the dispatch of Egyptian 
teachers given his lack of support for modern education and the use of oil revenue solely within the ruling 
family, Kuwait was able to use profits from oil, which increased massively from 1946 onwards, to found a 
number of boys’ schools, as did Bahrein.18 Eventually, the dispatch of teachers helped pave the way for the 
conforming of most school curricula across the Arab world to the Egyptian system, aided by local aspirations 
that Egyptian-style education would enable graduates to continue higher education in Egypt,19 and by the 
fact that Egyptian textbooks were acknowledged as the only quality ones available in the Arab world. A 
1940 British report from Kuwait on the textbooks used in schools around the Gulf notes how ‘most of them 
[are] produced in Egypt.’20 
Overall, the long history of Egypt’s educational system endowed the state with the capacity to cater to its 
Arab neighbours’ educational needs through the dispatch of teachers. This was also derived from the 
perception of the state’s position as ‘the intellectual and cultural center of the Arab world. In a certain sense,’ 
Qubain argued, ‘whatever happens in Egypt in the field of education affects the entire Arab world, for it is 
emulated and looked to for guidance and its educational influence radiates into every corner of the area.’21 At 
the same time, the policy of secondment reinforced this belief, through the promotion of Egyptian textbooks, 
the spreading of Egyptian-style educational system, and the admission of Arab students trained by Egyptians 
into Egyptian universities. Yet, the largely sporadic nature by which the Egyptian state responded to these 
needs implies that secondment did not yet constitute a state ‘policy’ in the sense of a well-defined set of state 
actions. It was only following the 1952 Revolution and Nasser’s rise to power that the expansion and 
politicization of educational missions abroad occurred, within a distinct foreign polic  agenda. 
 
III. GAMAL ABDEL NASSER & THE EXPANSION OF EGYPTIAN SECONDMENT 
                                            
17
 Sheikha Misnad, The Development of Modern Education in the Gulf. (London: Ithaca Press, 1985): 91. 
18
 Ibid: 34 
19
 Zaynab al-Najjar, "Enrolment in the Division of Public Service and Emigration: Is There a Conflict of Organisational 
Objectives?," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (1972, American University of Cairo): 18-9. 
20
 R/15/5/196. 
21
 Qubain, Education, 197. 
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The 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution coincided with a time of massive developmental needs across the Arab 
world, as the process of decolonization and the ‘triumph of nationalism,’ evident in the Levant, the Persian 
Gulf, and North Africa highlighted the need for an educated, trained bureaucracy.22 At the same time, new 
elites, some empowered with increasing oil revenues, now aimed to provide education for the people: ‘mass 
popular education was one of the first tasks which the new governments set themselves, and to which they 
devoted a high proportion of their revenues,’ argues Hourani. ‘Almost everywhere schools were opened on a 
large scale, in poor quarters of the towns and in some villages.’23 Britain’s post-World War II ‘exhaustion in 
the economic field’ and impeding withdrawal from the Middle East did not allow London to satisfy these 
countries’ need for trained manpower,24 while the British were traditionally suspect of expanding access to 
education across the Arab world.25  
This lacuna was filled by Nasserite Egypt, particularly after the Free Officers’ regime abandoned its early 
ambiguous ideological framework, and focused its attention to developments across the Arab world. ‘Only 
after the signing of the Suez Agreement our people began thinking in strategic terms;’ Nasser told the 
Sunday Times. ‘Until then we had concentrated only on Egypt.’26 By 1955, the Egyptian regime experienced 
a ‘shift in revolutionary action from the domestic to the international stage [that] was accompanied by a 
parallel redirection of ideological development whereby Egyptian nationalism evolved into Pan-Arabism.’27 
Following this shift, Egypt’s educational and secondment policies became a central component of ensuring 
the country’s aspiration as primus inter pares within the Arab world. 
Domestically, efforts were taken to rewrite school and university textbooks and adapt them to fit Egypt’s 
novel perceived geopolitical position and foreign policy interests,28 located within the Arab nation, the 
African continent, and the Muslim world.29 Law 213 of 1956 made education free for all Egyptians, while 
the regime also began changing the syllabi and curricula in order to make education ‘relevant to national 
                                            
22
 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples. (London: Faber & Faber, 2013): 381. 
23
 Ibid: 389 
24
 Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain's Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab 
Dependencies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994): 8. 
25
 Donald M. Reid, Cairo University and the Making of Modern Egypt. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
26
 Sunday Times, 1 August 1954. 
27
 Dekmejian, Egypt, 405. 
28
 United Arab Republic, Al-Talim al-Ali, 1963. There is a voluminous literature examining the educational reforms of the Free 
Officers’ Movement in Egypt. Most recently, see Laurie Brand, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and 
Algeria. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
29
 This refers to the well-known ‘Three Circles Theory’ in Nasser’s 1953-54 manifesto, Falsafat al-Thawra, drafted by regime 
stalwart (and later al-Ahram’s Chief Editor) Mohamed Hassanein Heikal. 
Page 6 of 24
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cbjm
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
7 
 
goals and aspiration.’30 In 1956, for instance, it was decided that, by the fifth grade, ‘the Egyptian child 
begins to study politics and reads about “The Arab World,” “The New Army,” “The Games of Workers,” 
“The Dam,” and “The Arab Hero.”’31 Louis Awad’s 1964 critique of the Nasserite educational system in al-
Ahram (who had been forced to resign from the position of Chairman of the Faculty of Letters at Cairo 
University in 1954) highlights a poem that primary school students were expected to memorize: 
I am an Arab, I love the Arabs. 
My father is an Arab, he loves the Arabs. 
My brother is an Arab, he loves the Arabs. 
Long live the Arabs. Long live the Arabs. 32 
The need to provide for the developmental needs of its Arab neighbours in the process of decolonization 
should be seen in this light. While Nasser rarely acknowledged Egyptians’ regional migration and the policy 
of secondment in his speeches, by 1954, as Cairo became ‘the base and capital of the Arab struggle from 
Oman to Algeria,’33 formal rules on secondment policy were established, and the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education was re-designated as the Ministry of Education and Public Instruction. Aspiring Egyptians were 
required to have at least three years’ experience, appropriate letters of reference, and to have completed their 
military service (if they were men). In later years, as the secondment program gained in popularity, 
successful applicants were also expected to be under 50 years of age, and to possess a degree qualifying 
them to serve as schoolteachers. The Ministry of Education would then decide who to select, and where they 
should be sent.34 The final step involved obtaining a work permit to leave the country, which was granted for 
a period of three years, renewable for a total of five. In order to obtain one, prospective Egyptians needed not 
to have a criminal record, and to indicate that they would ‘not work with an agency openly hostile to Egypt 
or its national interest [or] undermine the development goals of Egypt.’35 
[Table 1 here] 
The desire to tie Egyptians’ employment abroad with state foreign policy priorities was also evident among 
those who were employed abroad on individual contracts. A separate process was introduced for the latter (they 
had apply for a non-paid leave of absence from their place of work after obtaining a contract to work abroad for 
                                            
30
 Vatikiotis, History, 399. 
31
 Quoted in Joseph Szyliowicz, Education and Modernization in the Middle East. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973): 280; cf. 
Vatikiotis, History, 478-79. 
32
 Quoted in Szyliowicz, Education, 280; cf. Vatikiotis, History, 478-79. 
33
 Charles Davis Cremeans, The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy. (New York: Praeger, 1963): 44. 
34
 For more details, see: al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi, No. 296; 15 December 1967. 
35
 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "The Shift in Egypt's Migration Policy: 1952–1978," Middle Eastern Studies 18, 1 (1982). 
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a specific time period, usually granted for two years renewable, for a maximum of four), but at the personal 
request of the Minister, such time periods could be extended to six years, in cases where the Minister believed 
that national interest was involved.36 While statistics exist on officially seconded Egyptians, there can only be 
estimates of those employed on individual contracts (who frequently exceeded the number of seconded staff). 
In the 1956-57 year, for instance, five hundred teachers were officially seconded to Saudi Arabia, but more 
than six hundred teachers were estimated to be employed on an individual contract with the Saudis.37 
Under Nasser, it was the Egyptian authorities who enjoyed a central role in coordinating the secondment 
process, particularly since the lack of administrative resources in host countries prevented them from having 
any say in the types of teachers they would receive. This was mainly the Ministry of Education’s Department 
of Secondment, but the process by which host countries were to receive seconded Egyptians, however, was 
frequently opaque, and filtered through a variety of Free Officers’ channels. A British diplomatic report 
explains how Egyptian authorities approached neighbouring countries, in this case Sharjah’s Sheikh Saqr: 
[The Sheikh] had received a letter from a member of the Egyptian Council of the 
Revolution offering to send a number of school teachers and doctors to Sharjah at the 
Egyptian Government’s expense […] It turned out that the letter, which he showed 
me, was a private one, in manuscript and without any official heading, from a 
Colonel Abdel Hamid, whom Saqr had apparently met during his visit to Egypt last 
year, and who now wrote offering to show him the sights of Alexandria if he paid a 
further visit this year, and going on to suggest that the Egyptian Government should 
send to Sharjah six school teachers for the primary school there, and in addition, 
three engineers who would train students in mechanical and electrical engineering, 
also a doctor and a lady doctor. He said that the Egyptian Government would pay all 
expenses except accommodation.38 
Saqr’s experience was not unique, for the Ministry of Education typically provided for the salary and 
relocation expenses for these seconded Egyptian teachers. The Egyptian state agreed to finance the 
employment of its emigrants abroad, a fact that further points to their instrumentalisation by the Egyptian 
state: implied in such arrangements is that emigrants reported directly to Egypt, rather than the authorities of 
their host countries, and that host states had little choice but to accept the teachers that the Egyptian state 
chose to second, a process that favoured politically-minded teachers, as British reports and other first-hand 
accounts indicate: Charles Cremeans, who worked as a teacher in the Arab world, reported that Egyptian 
teachers ‘are indoctrinated before going to their foreign posts and are instructed to act as representatives of 
                                            
36
 Amr Mohie-Eldin and Ahmed Omar, "The Emigration of Universities' Academic Staff,"  (Unpublished Paper. MIT/Cairo 
University Technology Planning Program, 1978). 
37
 al-Jumhuriya, 8 June 1957 
38
 ‘Egypt’s Campaign to Spread its Influence by Dispatch of Egyptian Teachers Abroad, ’Elizabeth Monroe Collection, Middle East 
Centre Archive, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford. 
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their country and its policies.’39 Details of this indoctrination remain unknown, but according to official 
channels, ‘the Ministry prepares training seminars’ to selected teachers, in order to ‘acquaint them with the 
countries that they will be serving at’ and ‘to enlighten them.’40 In Iraq, the New York Times somewhat 
alarmingly reported that Egyptian teachers ‘had received special training in propaganda and sabotage in 
Egypt,’41 while the Times identified that teachers employed in Libya had been ‘seconded from the Egyptian 
army.’42 
It can be argued that the harsh living and working conditions for Egyptians in the Arab world in the mid-
1950s led to the recruitment of those teachers eager to undertake secondment appointments, and to ‘take with 
them the flame of Nasser-type nationalism.’43  In an effort to strengthen the identification of seconded 
Egyptians with the Egyptian state, Egyptians’ participation in the secondment program was valorised 
through the publication of annual lists of seconded teachers across the main state newspapers.44 In fact, the 
degree to which these professionals represented foreign policy interests of the Egyptian state cannot be 
underestimated. This is further evident from the fact that the policy of secondment was pursued at the 
expense of Egypt’s own educational development at a time when the state was suffering from a lack of 
qualified teaching staff: ‘the export of teachers was a sacrifice to Egyptians,’ writes Wynn. ‘Up and down 
the Nile valley, it is common sight to see Egyptian schoolrooms empty for lack of teachers.’45 Yet, the 
official state line remained that ‘Egypt believes that it is her duty to help her sister Arab states to develop 
their education and learning,’ according to an al-Jumhuriya report, ‘and that this development will not be 
achieved unless Egypt supplies these states with their needs for teachers at any cost.’46 
Egypt’s secondment program gradually became a main component of the Nasserite propaganda machine 
across the Arab world, together with a variety of other elements, from radio broadcasts of the Voice of the 
Arabs, to the distribution of Egyptian newspapers abroad, as will be detailed below, within the context of the 
‘Arab Cold War.’47 A British report on Sudan details how ‘Egypt’s cultural leadership in the Arab world is 
                                            
39
 Cremeans, The Arabs, 41. 
40
 Al-Talim al-Ali. 
41
 The New York Times, 17 May 1957. 
42
 The Times, 25 November 1958. 
43
 Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity. (Clinton, MA: Colonial Press, 1959): 137. 
44
 Al-Ahram, 11 July 1956. 
45
 Wynn, Nasser, 136. 
46
 al-Jumhuriya, 8 June 1957. 
47
 See Laura James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Malcolm Kerr, The Arab 
Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, 3d ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
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10 
 
unrivalled and her present Government exploits it to the full in pursuit of political aims. Egyptian teachers 
are sent to the Sudan; Sudanese teachers are trained in Egypt.’48 But, if these accusations sand, why did Arab 
governments continue to employ Egyptian teachers?  
First, there was an overall lack of trained, local manpower: countries like Iraq, Jordan, and Libya simply did 
not have enough manpower to meet their needs, and Egyptians, as native speakers of Arabic, were the main 
alternative solution.49 For instance, the Saudi Arabian Bureau of Experts, created by the Saudi Council of 
Ministers in 1954 in order to advise King Saud, had to be staffed almost exclusively by Egyptians, as there 
were no Saudi lawyers.50 In fact, it was estimated that the entire country had no more than twenty doctors 
throughout the 1950s,51  while a 1960 United Nations’ survey estimated that 95 percent of Saudi civil 
servants only had elementary school education.52 Furthermore, the discovery of oil lured local graduates 
away from teaching positions towards more lucrative ones. This was particularly true in Saudi Arabia: ‘the 
trouble remains that Egyptian teachers are available and that local young men have no reason to enter 
teaching as a career,’ argues a British report. ‘These young men feel that they can do better by staying in 
Jiddah, Mecca, or Riyadh where the pay may be smaller but the opportunities are greater […].’53 ‘Even 
before Saudi Arabia was unified as a state, the Saud regime was dependent on foreign workers: Ibn Saud’s 
advisers, as well as the area’s doctors and teachers in the few existing schools came from Syria and Egypt.54 
Second, Egyptian teachers were affordable, frequently provided for free by the Egyptian state, while Great 
Britain was financially unable to subsidize the costs of seconded British teachers in the Middle East. As a 
result, the latter invariably had their contracts terminated as too costly, and replaced by Egyptians,55 despite 
frequent, disquieting warnings from British diplomats against this. At the twilight of ‘Britain’s moment in 
the Middle East,’ the British were financially unable to provide alternatives: ‘we cannot ask the Persian Gulf 
Rulers to give up employing Egyptian teachers’ reads a British report, ‘because they cannot obtain a 
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49
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50
 Judith Marie Barsalou, "Foreign Labor in Sa'udi Arabia: The Creation of a Plural Society," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (1985, 
Columbia University): 134. 
51
 Helen Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia. (London: Ithaca Press, 1978): 81. 
52
 Summer Scott Huyette, "Political Adaptation in Sa'udi Arabia: A Study of the Council of Ministers," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis 
(1983, Columbia University): 197. 
53
 ‘Egypt’s Campaign,’ Monroe Collection. 
54
 Lackner, A House, 191. 
55
 The Sunday Times, 28 March 1954. 
Page 10 of 24
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cbjm
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 
11 
 
sufficient number of qualified Arabic-speaking teachers from any other source.’ 56  Similar economic 
considerations made Egyptian teachers more attractive to Palestinian expatriate teachers, who had been 
forced to resettle in the thousands across the Arab world in the post-1948 era. While Palestinian 
professionals contributed significantly to the economic and cultural life of the Levant and the Gulf,57 the 
Egyptian state’s unique capacity to train, organise, and finance its educational staff’s stay abroad increased 
Egyptians’ attractiveness in the eyes of Arab host states.   
In Yemen, for instance, Egypt covered all its teachers’ expenses. In Lebanon, which had little demand for 
teachers of Arabic, ‘the Egyptian government paid salaries of Egyptian teachers supplied to private Muslim 
schools which otherwise would have been unable to support a teaching staff.’58 Saudi Arabia only provided 
an allowance to seconded Egyptian teachers, whose salary was still provided for by the Egyptian state, but 
paid all teachers working through individual contracts.59 Libya traditionally relied on Egypt for teachers’ 
expenses during this period: ‘I’ve never been so rich in my life,’ one seconded Egyptian administrator said to 
a Sunday Times’ reporter in Tripoli. ‘I’m seconded by the Egyptian Government, who pay my salary at home 
in addition to my salary here; they fly me home free for my annual leave.’60 
Third, the recruitment of seconded Egyptian teachers often served as a signal of a pro-Egyptian stance.61 For 
instance, shortly after Sudanese independence the new government was accused by opposition forces of 
‘encouraging Egyptian infiltration and propaganda’ because of its recruitment of Egyptian doctors and 
teachers. In Yemen, the tense relations between the ruling Imam and Nasser during 1956 translated in 
‘Egyptian offers of irrigation engineers, who would be extremely useful in the coastal plan, [being] refused,’ 
as the British reported. ‘Egyptian teachers went on leave from Sana’a several months ago and are not being 
encouraged to return […]’62 In Iraq, as the 1958 Revolution ousted King Faisal II and allowed for the two 
states’ gradual rapprochement once ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim withdrew Iraq from the pro-Western Baghdad 
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Pact, Egypt would be providing Iraq with additional teachers by 1961, including a number of professors for 
the Basra medical college.63 
Last but not least, some Arab governments perceived the dangers of the politicized nature of Egyptian 
professionals to be outweighed by the benefits of development. Indicatively, the Kuwaiti Minister of 
Education rebuffed British criticism of seconded Egyptian teachers’ political activism in Kuwait by arguing 
for the importance of education: 
‘Suppose that we want to follow the logic of the writer, what conclusions will his 
premises lead us to? He says that schools should not be built in, say, Kuwait unless 
there are enough Kuwaiti teachers to staff them and adds that the Kuwaitis are not 
keen on the profession of teaching and that the numbers of the Kuwaiti teachers are 
on the decrease. Does it not follow, then, according to this remarkable piece of 
reasoning, that a state like Kuwait should indefinitely stop building schools out of her 
tremendous income from the oil which has revolutionalised all aspects of life in the 
country? How can we ever get out of this vicious circle except by inviting teachers 
from the Arab countries to start the process of supplying the country with her need of 
professional men?’64 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 
IV. GAMAL ABDEL NASSER & THE POLITICIZATION OF EGYPTIAN SECONDMENT 
The expansion of Egypt’s secondment policy was accompanied, as the British warned, with its politicization. 
In an attempt to understand the nature of seconded Egyptians’ politicization, we examine their activities in 
Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the Persian Gulf countries. It is far from accidental that the Egyptian regime 
dispatched educational providers across these areas, for complex linguistic and urban networks existed 
across the region as a result of both historic and imperial networks. These structures upon the Free Officers’ 
regime was able to develop flows of human resources, what Ann Laura Stoker terms ‘imperial debris,' 
predated Nasser and allowed such flows to occur more seamlessly and incur less resistance.65 
The Libyan case underlines the main reasons why Nasser’s policy of secondment was a success across the 
Arab world, complementing the Egyptian regime’s wish to undermine the pro-Western monarchy and to spread 
pan-Arab ideas in the neighbouring state.66 Sir Alec Kirkbride, Britain’s ambassador to Libya, reported: 
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The most important means by which Egyptian influence is spread is through the 
activities of the numerous Egyptian officials who are employed by the Libyan 
authorities. It is not unnatural that, in the absence of trained Libyan candidates for a 
vacancy, resort should be had to the engagement of Egyptians. Egypt is the nearest 
source of supply for Arab officials, many part of the Libyan administration are 
modelled on the Egyptian pattern and lastly the Egyptian Government continues to 
pay the salaries of Egyptian civil servants seconded to Libya and allows them to 
draw, in addition, the Libyan salaries attached to their posts. These Egyptians are, 
therefore, less costly to the Libyan Government than British personnel or than 
unsubsidised Arabs from other Middle Eastern countries. The most damage to British 
interests is being done by the considerable number of Egyptian teachers who are 
employed in the Libyan schools. These people are in a position to poison the mind of 
the rising generation of Libyans against the Western Powers in general and against 
Great Britain in particular.67 
 
Egyptians’ involvement in Libya extended beyond administering classes: seconded professionals drafted the 
Libyan labour code (essentially the Egyptian labour code, with minor alterations), while the Libyan University, 
established in 1955, was initially staffed solely by Egyptian professors.68  By 1956, the New York Times 
reported that Libya hosted ‘large contingents of Egyptian teachers, advisers, and government administrators 
[whose] penetration into almost every field of Libyan life has become a matter of Western alarm. For these 
Egyptians are also helping carry on Premier Nasser’s anti-Western campaign. There are almost 500 Egyptian 
teachers in Libyan secondary schools.’ Within schools, seconded Egyptians taught a distinct, pro-Nasserite 
version of history: 
The presence of Egyptian teachers explains why so many classrooms show the 
influence of Egyptian propaganda. Pupils do crayon drawings of Egyptian troops 
winning victories over Israel or Britain. In Benghazi, Libya, a complete course in 
Egyptian history is given to secondary school students. A display in a high school art 
exhibit showed pictures of the leading rules of Egypt; on one side were the “bad” 
rules, on the other the “good” rulers. The bad rulers began with the Pharaoh Cheops, 
who enslaved his people to build the pyramids, and ended with Farouk. The good 
rulers began with the idealistic Pharaoh Ikhnaton and ended with, of course, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser.69 
Teachers’ work in Libya was aided by the fact that the textbooks used were printed and imported from Egypt, 
heavy on ideas of Arab unity and the struggle against imperialism. A seventh grade reading book contained ‘the 
elements that make the Arab student feel that a new spirit exists in him, and create in his character the pride in 
language, Arab nationalism and the Arab Nation.’ A chapter under the title ‘I am an Arab’ states: ‘I am an 
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Arab. Yes, I say it with all pride and happiness. I am not alone. Every Arab is my brother in language, religion, 
feeling and nationhood… Yes, I am an Arab from Libya.’70 
The broader effects of Egyptian presence in Libya were arguably predictable: ‘the people, particularly the 
schoolchildren, are always ready to applaud Nasser.’71 Seconded Egyptians’ political activism was widely 
known to the Libyan regime. British diplomatic reports detail how, in July 1965, Libyan secret police was 
planted in secondary school classrooms to detect Egyptian teachers who were disseminating Nasserite ideas. 
Eighty Egyptians were sent back to Cairo, and were replaced by Tunisian teachers.72 According to British 
reports: 
‘The planting of secret police in class-rooms in secondary schools may seem 
grotesque, but it is to be remembered that many of the twenty-one and twenty-two 
year old pupils are very grown up in appearance. Outwitted in the schools, the 
Egyptians have apparently turned to the mosques. Many Egyptian, Azhar-trained, 
sheikhs are now in Libya and use the pulpit (minbar) as a political forum.’73  
In fact, expulsions of politically active Egyptian teachers occurred regularly across the Arab world – from 
Kuwait in the mid-1960s,74 to Lebanon, where Egyptians were charged of ‘inciting the Lebanese to revolt and 
paying money to foment revolution.’75 Saudi Arabia also expelled Egyptian teachers multiple times in the 
1960s due to their political activism.76 Yet, Arab regimes’ inability to find adequate numbers of replacement 
teachers meant that such expulsions were only temporary. In Libya, King Idris had stated ‘very emphatically’ 
how he aimed to terminate the contracts of all Egyptians, and replace them by having ‘all students do a period 
of schoolteaching before they were able to obtain employment, e.g. in government offices’ as a type of 
‘national service,’77 a plan that never materialized. ‘Time and again, they have been expelled by various Arab 
governments for political agitation […] in the end they are taken back. Arabs must become literate, and to do so 
they must accept Egyptian teachers.’78 
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A notable exception is Syria, with which Egypt formed the short-lived al-Jumhūriya al-‘Arabiyya al-
Mutaḥḥida (UAR, 1958-1962) at a time when Nasser’s ‘influence in the Arab world was at its height.’79 A year 
before the creation of the UAR, on March 25 1957, the two states’ Ministers of Education signed an agreement 
to unify their school curricula.80 Egypt proceeded to nominate the Egyptian Minister of Education, Kamal al-
Din Husayn as UAR Education Minister and the head of a United Teachers Council. Nasser began the process 
of transferring Egyptian professionals and army personnel to Syria, and vice versa.81 In Damascus, seconded 
Egyptian teachers were expected to join the Syro-Egyptian Club, which had been established under the 
auspices of the Egyptian Embassy.82 According to Canadian archives, 300 Egyptians served in the Education 
and Agriculture Ministries, while 130 were employed in the Public Works Ministry.83 In the March-August 
1960 time alone, Americans estimated that 325 teachers, 29 doctors, 35 judges, and 150 engineers arrived in 
Damascus from Egypt.84 The report argued that every Syrian ministry included a top Egyptian official who ran 
its affairs. In addition to seconded professionals, some 10,000 to 20,000 other Egyptians working 
independently in Syria.85 
Seconded Egyptians’ reported wish to spread Nasserite ideals created an array of problems in Syria. Syrians 
equated Egyptian presence with Ottoman, French, and British colonialism, and secondees’ activities with 
Egyptian domination (tasallut). A common Syrian perception was that Egypt aimed to lower domestic 
unemployment by exporting Egyptians en masse to Syria.86 Egyptian policy in this matter was deemed to be 
one of ‘Egyptianization instead of unification.’87 As Mahmud Riad, Nasser’s adviser on Syrian affairs, noted: 
‘the term Egyptian hegemony (haymana) was often used when an Egyptian […] was found in a Syrian working 
place,’ while Riad himself was often characterized as a ‘high commissioner’ and a ‘viceroy.’ Mustafa al-
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Barudi, the Syrian Minister of Propaganda, complained that ‘the smallest member of the (Egyptian) retinue 
thought that he had inherited our country. [Egyptians] spread “like octopuses” everywhere.’88 
The disintegration of the UAR, due to a number of issues, signalled the return of Egyptians from Syria. In fact, 
the repatriation of Egyptians started within a day of the coup - Kamal Rif‘at, the Minister of Labor, and 
Tharwat Ukashah, the Minister of Education, were reported on their way back to Egypt, accompanied by 85 
Egyptians. The exodus via Lebanon started on Oct. 1. By Oct. 4, 7,000 Egyptian civilians had reportedly been 
repatriated.89  ‘Who were the Egyptians in Syria?’ Mohamed Hassanein Heikal asked. ‘They were not in 
Damascus [and] they were not in Aleppo. They were engineers who went to supplement the Syrian engineers. 
They were doctors in the villages.’ Attempting to ward off criticism of Egyptian secondees’ conduct in Syria, 
Heikal – a close associate of President Nasser – argued that it was ‘the voluntary, pioneering work of Egyptian 
technicians in Syria [that] gave rise to the charge that Egypt was unloading her unemployed on Syria”.90  
The abundant presence of trained local staff in Syria created problems for Egypt’s secondment policy that were 
not encountered elsewhere: already by 1956, the British reported that ‘the Egyptians have a definite policy 
which can be fairly easily defined [as] virulent and hostile propaganda’ across the countries of the Persian 
Gulf.91 In Bahrain, Egyptians and other Arabs ‘played a major role in the development of the political and 
cultural consciousness of [Arab] nationalism in Bahraini society’ spreading Nasserite ideas and advocating for 
a constitution and representative institutions.92 In Dubai, Egyptian intelligence officers were reported to have 
infiltrated groups of incoming teachers in order to incite students and spread Nasserite ideas.93 Donald Hawley, 
a British diplomat stationed in the United Arab Emirates in the late 1950s, describes in his published memoirs 
how pictures of Nasser decorated Dubai’s school walls.94 He details how celebrations supporting Egyptian 
policies were held at a school event in 1961, while school sports days were usually employed for Nasserite 
speeches.95 Hawley also recalls young boys shouting out to him, ‘Down with colonization and long live 
Gamal!’96According to interviewees’ recollections of events in Dubai: 
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‘many young boys were encouraged by senior students and expatriate staff to 
demonstrate in the streets while carrying banners and photos of Jamal Abdel 
Nasser. Most worryingly, Sheikh Rashid’s guards had to be called in to disperse the 
students, as it seemed that they were heading towards the only school in Dubai that 
was not participating in the agitation.’97 
By 1957, Kuwait was ‘heavily infiltrated with Egyptian influence,’ as the New York Times reported: 400 
Egyptians were reported to be working within the Kuwaiti government, while only 97 out of the 1,100 teachers 
in the country were Kuwaiti citizens. Teachers were also reported to incite the nationalist movement against the 
Sabah regime, which was not able to expel them because of strong popular sympathy for Egypt, particularly in 
the aftermath of the 1956 War. The Suez crisis led to a series of long strikes across Kuwait in October and 
November 1956, while some four thousand Kuwaiti youths had officially volunteered to fight in Egypt, despite 
Sheikh Abdullah’s strong disapproval. A countrywide boycott of British and French goods was organized by 
the Ministry of Education, and enforced by groups of seconded teachers. Abdul Aziz Husayn, the Ministry’s 
Director, was educated in Cairo, and ‘naturally leans towards Egyptian educational methods and the 
employment of Egyptian teachers in Kuwaiti schools.’ 98  According to British reports, the boycott’s 
enforcement was organized by: 
young women patrols (mostly Egyptian teachers) who started going round in twos 
and threes visiting shops and preaching to the shopkeepers the sin of selling to the 
foreigner. Their methods are ‘highly abusive’ and large and small merchants are 
warned by the patrols that they are being watched and that any slackness on their 
part, or if one English woman was seen in their shops, a report would 
straightaway be sent to the ‘Cultural Club,’ whence orders would at once go out to 
have their shop windows broken. These young women patrols have been seen at 
work,’ the report concludes, ‘but it would appear that all are Egyptians.99 
Overall, ‘the education system and the social clubs [were] completely Egyptian influenced,’ while Egyptians 
pressured for sharing of the oil profits across all Arabs: ‘Egyptians have said that Kuwait’s oil is Arab oil and 
that in the interests of the Arab people all Arab resources should be shared among all the Arabs.’100  A 
particularly striking display of Egyptian teachers’ influence in Kuwait was the Sports Gala of Kuwaiti 
Secondary Schools in Shuwaikh, held in May 1957 and featuring 2,100 student participants from 26 schools 
across the country. According to an eye-witness report of the event: 
1. The tune which welcomed spectators just before the gala began was that of the 
favourite song of ‘Voice of the Arabs.’ It was entitled, ‘Woe to the Colonisers.’  
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2. The historical tableaux which appeared in the program included: a representation 
of the battle of Port Said, which took the form of a float bearing a boat with sailors 
and an effigy of a descending parachutist. The sailors in the boat were shooting down 
the parachutist. Written in large letters on the side of the float was: ‘Get out of my 
Canal.’ 
3. A physical training display which was the last event in the programme, consisted 
of exercises performed to the tune of a song specially composed for the occasion by 
an Egyptian inspector of education. Each verse of this song recalled one of the Arab 
states: Egypt was represented as the champion of Arab freedom and the repeller of 
the aggressors; Yemen as the protector of Aden who was called upon to liberate her; 
Syria was described as the home of true nationalism, while Iraqis were the subject of 
sarcastic praise for their skill in picking dates with their finger-tips.’ 
These points together with the lengthy displays in which hundreds of small boys took 
part with air-rifles, made this gala nearer in character to a military rally than to a 
sporting event.101 
Similarly, Egyptian teachers were welcomed in Qatar, which did not develop an educational system until the 
mid-1950s, because Sheikh Ali Abdullah al-Thani ‘did not accept the idea of modern education until 1956.’102 
The Iraqi monarchy, on the other hand, was less amenable to seconded Egyptians’ political activism: in early 
1957, the Iraqi government claimed that ‘teachers were a potent factor in the spread of Nasser propaganda and 
that they helped incite youths to demonstrations that resulted in eleven deaths [in November 1956], mostly in 
Mosul. [Teachers were found to] have agitated against the regime by encouraging students to howl on streets 
for severance of relations with Britain and France.’ As a result, the New York Times reported how 25 Egyptian 
teachers were expelled, albeit in an operation that was ‘carried out with restraint,’ and which spared university 
professors, ‘who are still needed.’ 103  The animosity betwe n Egypt and Iraq subsided in the immediate 
aftermath of the 1958 Iraqi Revolution: ‘co-operation with the U.A.R. is being steadily pursued in the 
educational field,’ the British reported, ‘both in matters of syllabus and in the recruitment of Egyptian teachers, 
and Egyptian experts have been accepted in the Codification Department of the Ministry of Justice, in the Oil 
Affairs Department of the Ministry of Economics, and in the Government Oil Refineries Administration 
[…].’104 
Beyond the Persian Gulf, it was in the context of the 1962–1970 Civil War in North Yemen that Nasser’s 
secondment policy was most extensively employed for political purposes. While Nasser’s increasing 
engagement in the conflict and the travails of more than 60,000 Egyptian soldiers in Yemen is well known,105 
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little research has been conducted in seconded Egyptians’ involvement in Yemen throughout this period. 
Nasser, eager to promote a nationalist uprising in Yemen since the mid-1950s, was initially supposed to send 
teachers and other professionals to Yemen at the request of Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr, the oldest son 
of Imam Ahmed bin Yahya, in 1959. This request was formally cancelled by the Imam himself, who was aware 
of Egyptians’ political activism in Yemen: earlier, on 20 March 1958, a ‘crowd of roughly five hundred led by 
Egyptian teachers, marched with flares to the [Yemeni] Palace,’ while, a few days later, ‘all Egyptian teachers’ 
in Sana’a marched ‘together with 2,000 demonstrators’ towards the Saudi Arabia Delegation in Sana’a, where 
they ‘broke into the courtyard and smashed all the windows.’ The Yemeni Imam apologized to King Saud in a 
cable, noting ‘we are Arab brothers and must accept sorrow with good heart.’106 
Cairo continued dispatching Egyptian teachers and other professionals across Yemen with the Imam’s tacit 
permission, as their presence was necessary for the country’s process modernization, despite the fact that they 
were known to engage in political activism: ‘to the pervading influence of Cairo radio among the common 
people and intellectuals,’ a 1958 British report adds, ‘should be added the disproportionate influence of the 
Egyptian teachers in Sana’a and Ta‘izz.’107. In 1959, seconded Egyptians began arriving with their families in 
Hodeida, where the Imam ‘welcomed’ them declaring that Yemen was ‘waiting for UAR experts to start 
building the first Yemeni spinning and textile factory.’108 O’ Ballance explains: 
Partly because there was no alternative, Egyptians working in the country as military 
instructors, school teachers and doctors, all subtly and insidiously aided the spread of 
Nasser’s views. Under the Crown Prince’s urging, Imam Ahmed had allowed some 
Egyptian school teachers into the Yemen to start a few secular schools and to give 
advanced education to sons of richer families, and their number had been increased 
during the Imam’s absence in Italy. All this had a profound effect on young, restless, 
impressionable minds in the Yemen [resulting in August 1962] demonstrations in 
some of the secular schools against alleged approval by the Imam of the American 
bases in Saudi Arabia.109 
In particular, the arrival of Sayed Abdul Ghani Mabrouk, Mahmoud Mohamed Mahmoud, and Hindawi 
Yaseen Hindi three teachers Egypt seconded to the Ta‘izz School in Yemen in January 1959, led the British to 
report that ‘the school in Ta’izz [was] now controlled by the Egyptians.’ British reports argued that: 
All three are believed to have been especially selected by the Egyptian government. 
Their teaching of course follows the usual line of the unity of the Arabs and the 
infallibility of Nasser. The leader is Abdel Ghani Mabrouk, an athletic type and a 
boxer who has the admiration of the students. He played a leading role in the 
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Accession and Port Said celebrations in November and December. We also learn that 
he was active earlier in his career in Libya, where he is alleged to have been 
imprisoned for political activities and indecency.110  
A few months later a number of different pamphlets, originating from Egypt, were intercepted by the British in 
Ta‘izz. One read:  
Oh sons of Yemen, the army and the people! Your brothers in the United Arab 
Republic and the Republic of Iraq know everything about you. All of them wish to 
rid themselves of the cheating gang which adopt guile and lies […] All the Arabs are 
with us if, in the first place, we can prove that we are with each other. We must 
march to the battle lines and those free rebels who toppled Farouk and Faisal would 
not abandon us. 
Another intercepted pamphlet that was being distributed in Yemen read:   
Do not clap for Gamal. O sons of Yemen whose hearts are shaken whenever Gamal 
is mentioned and whose tongues constantly speak of him. Gamal Abdel Nasser does 
not need your applause nor does he require your admiration. […] Your biggest 
compliment to Gamal would be when you united together and organise yourselves, 
eliminating the monarchy and declaring the birth of the new Yemeni People’s 
Republic, as your brothers have done in Iraq […] The nation is above all and under 
no rule but that of the people.111 
Once Iman bin Yahya died in September 1962, Abdullah al-Sallal challenged the legitimacy of Mohamad al-
Badr by declaring the Yemen Arab Republic. Effectively, the royalists, headed by al-Badr, now the new Imam, 
and backed by Saudi Arabia, were pitied against the republicans, headed by al-Sallal and supported by Egypt. 
Confidential archival documents report how al-Sallal ‘appealed to Egypt primarily for support against potential 
foreign intervention, from Saudi Arabia or the British in Aden, and for Egyptian technical and administrative 
help. Consequently, Egypt moved into Yemen, not only with tanks, jets and soldiers, but also with almost 300 
primary and secondary school teachers, administrative advisors, doctors for the new hospitals […],’112 in a 
pattern reminiscent of the 1798 Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. 
By 1964, the Arab Observer, a mouthpiece for the Egyptian regime, was reporting that Egypt had helped 
establish fourteen hospitals staffed by 30 Egyptian doctors, a mental hospital in Sana’a, a veterinary 
administration, and two agricultural institutes. According to Abdel Rahman al-Attar, an Egyptian engineer 
serving as the Director of the Technical Aid Office for Yemen: 
The UAR took great care to send to Yemen the best teams and experts in spite of 
their being badly needed in the UAR […] Experts from the UAR Ministry of 
Scientific Research and the Ministry of Agriculture were sent to Yemen […] 
Economists and finance experts were also seconded to Yemen and the result was the 
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emergence of a State Budget covering the expenses and revenues for a whole year; 
the first of its kind in the history of Yemen.113 
Egyptians’ presence in Yemen was instrumental in developing the country’s infrastructure. According to the 
New York Times’ correspondent’s account: 
I was impressed also by the extent of the Egyptians’ “hearts and minds” campaign 
among the Yemenis [such as] installing water pumps, school-teaching and providing 
all kinds of professional services and advice – agricultural, engineering and medical. 
These were all ways of introducing the Yemenis to modern life, ways in which the 
Egyptians could do things for the Yemeni people which their traditional leaders 
could not. The Egyptians had also brought 100 Egyptian ulema into the country, in 
the hopes of persuading the Yemenis that there were really no important differences 
between the Sunnis and the Shia in general, and the Shaffei and Zeidi sects in 
particular. They may even have tried to persuade the Zeidis that they did not really 
need an Imam.114 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
[Under Nasser] an Egyptian was looked upon as the man with the ‘ugly face’ 
throughout the Arab world. For twenty years, every Egyptian had seemed to 
turn into a spy or saboteur. Every Egyptian teacher was thought to have 
come to overthrow the standing rule and to distribute subversive literature. 
Every Egyptian doctor was considered a spy acting for Egyptian Intelligence 
Service to set one class against another.115  
This analysis of Egypt’ secondment policy in the aftermath of the Free Officers’ Revolution aimed to 
provide novel insights into Arab politics in the 1952-1967 period, by focusing on how the Nasserite regime 
expanded upon, and politicized, Egyptian teachers’ regional migration processes. By highlighting the 
conduct of seconded Egyptians in Libya, Syria, the Persian Gulf countries, and Yemen, the article painted a 
more accurate picture of the politics of regional migration in the Middle East. It argued that this phenomenon 
constituted a key aspect of the decolonization process in the Middle East, and a central instrument in 
Nasser’s foreign policy towards other Arab states. British diplomatic and consular reports further highlight 
these aspects while also projecting the disquietude of an Empire in retreat. This allowed for a better 
understanding of Egyptian migration under Nasser away from essentialist accounts of population immobility 
and restrictive state policies. 
At the same time, the analysis highlights two themes that merit deeper analysis: first, a discussion on how the 
Egyptian regime viewed its regional migration policy as an instrument of power. Little is known about how 
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effective Nasser himself considered this instrument, but the continuing financing of Egypt’s secondment 
policy, even at times of economic hardship in the 1960s, points to its importance for the regime. The inherent 
contradictions of this policy, however, were not lost on him. Referring to the dispatch of Egyptian 
professionals to Syria, Nasser commented: ‘we are at a loss. If we send people to Syria, it is said that they 
have come to rule. If we do not send them, it is said that Egypt does not care.’116 This analysis allows for a 
better understanding of the Egyptian regime’s evaluation of its own regional migration policy, which 
occurred after Nasser’s death in 1970. Convinced for the need for cooperation, rather than antagonism, with 
Egypt’s Arab counterparts, Anwar Sadat included the de-politicization of Egyptian migration in the regime’s 
broader process of ‘de-Nasserization,’ as the section’s opening quote indicates.117 
Secondly, this analysis leads to a more accurate contextualization of the politics of Egyptian migration 
within key events across the Arab world – from the rising nationalist sentiment in North Africa that resulted 
in the 1969 overthrow of King Idris, to the reasons for the disintegration of the United Arab Republic, and 
from the struggle between monarchical and revolutionary regimes in the Persian Gulf, to the bloody Yemeni 
Civil War – and paves the way for future research into the impact of Egyptian regional migration upon 
Middle East politics of the era and upon the mindset of future Arab elites, in particular. Colonel Qaddafi’s 
deep admiration of Nasser, for instance, stemmed partly from his exposure to Egyptian teachers and 
newspapers in Sabha during the 1950s. Egyptians’ activism had an opposite effect upon Saudi elites, which 
only overcame their distrust of Egyptian migrants once Sadat came to power, when the latter were given 
preferential treatment over Palestinians and Yemenis. Such broader questions about the role of Egyptian 
teachers or, indeed, other seconded professionals, in the Arab region point to the need to reconceptualise 
migration in the Nasserite years away from notions of restrictive measures or population immobility towards 
a more accurate understanding of how it buttress the regime’s regional vision, and intra-Arab politics overall. 
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Table 1 
Total Number of Egyptian Teachers in Arab and Other Countries, (1953 – 1964)1 
Year Teachers in Arab States 
1953 – 54 580 
1955 – 56 1,198 
1958 – 59 2,696 
1961 – 62 2,948 
1962 – 63 3,512 
1963 – 64 4,615 
 
                                            
1 United Arab Republic, 1965. Unfortunately, the report does not specific particular host countries. 
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Table 2 
Egyptian Teachers Seconded to Arab States by Destination, (1953 – 1962)1 
Country 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Saudi Arabia 206 293 401 500 454 551 727 866 1027 
Jordan - 8 20 31 56 - - - - 
Lebanon 25 25 39 36 75 111 251 131 104 
Kuwait 114 180 262 326 395 435 490 480 411 
Bahrain 15 15 18 25 25 25 26 28 36 
Morocco - - - 20 75 81 175 210 334 
Sudan - - - - 580 632 673 658 653 
Qatar - 1 3 5 8 14 17 18 24 
Libya 55 114 180 219 217 232 228 391 231 
Yemen - 12 11 8 17 17 17 14 0 
Iraq 76 112 121 136 63 449 - - - 
Palestine 13 32 34 37 46 120 166 175 165 
Somalia - - 25 23 57 69 90 109 213 
 
                                            
1 Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Education, Department of Secondment. 
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